On September 15, CBC Radio host of The Current, Anna Maria Tremonti, discussed the controversy over some pharmacists’ conscientious objection to dispensing certain drugs. Two of her guests were Calgary Pharmacist Maria Bizecki and Professor Francoise Baylis who is a Professor of Bioethics and Philosophy at Dalhousie University in Halifax.

This is a letter I wrote in response:

Dear Ms. Tremonti,

Thank you for discussing an important issue on your radio show on September 15, that of freedom of conscience in the health care profession. I would like to make a comment regarding something one of your guests said.

Professor Francoise Baylis from Dalhousie University said she agreed, in principle, with the rights of health care professionals to refuse to take part in activities which go against their consciences. But she warned that, in practice, this could pose a danger to a woman’s reproductive freedom, putting the onus on the woman to find appropriate care if a particular health care professional won’t give her what she wants.

What is very troubling about this remark is its logical inconsistency. As soon as a woman relies on a pharmacist for birth control pills or “emergency contraception,” she has already given up some of her reproductive freedom. So the danger to women’s reproductive freedom is the reliance on the drug itself, not the pharmacist’s refusal to dispense it. If a woman wants complete freedom, if she wants control over the situation, if she truly wants to be unrestricted in her actions regarding pregnancy, then she necessarily cannot rely on somebody else to help her achieve what she wants. She must rely on herself. If one chooses to rely on someone else to provide something, then that person has given up some freedom, because now there is someone else involved in the equation, someone who may have an opposing view, there may be conflicting rights, etc., and so now there must be a process of negotiation. If a woman does not want to be constrained by the ethical views of a pharmacist, then she can take control of the situation – and her reproductive freedom – by not getting them involved. For example, she can accept responsibility for finding a pharmacist who is willing to meet her request, rather than demand it from someone who opposes her views. Or she can prevent herself from being in a situation where the services of a pharmacist are required in the first place (for example, there are ways to control fertility without relying on pills, and in that way the pharmacist need not be involved.) In this way she, and not somebody else, is in control of her fertility (obviously I am not talking about cases of rape).

Bottom line: it is illogical to talk about a person’s “reproductive freedom” or as we often hear “the right to control one’s own body” and in the same breath say that a third-party is required to help her achieve it. As soon as she needs this other person, she is by definition not in control and has chosen to give up some of her freedom. In other words one cannot have total reproductive freedom AND be dependent on someone else to help her carry out her reproductive choices. They are mutually exclusive.

Thus those who expect health care professionals to meet women’s reproductive demands do not actually want reproductive freedom for women (whereby the woman has complete control over herself as discussed above); rather what they want is reproductive control over others. So it would have been more accurate for Prof. Baylis to have said that the rights of health care professionals to refuse to take part in activities which go against their consciences could, in practice, pose a threat to a woman’s desire for reproductive control over health care professionals.

Sincerely,
Barbara McAdorey
Richmond ON